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The approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law has been launched on March 1st
1998 when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Ukraine and 
the EU came into force. Article 51 of the PCA circumscribes priorities within which 
the approximation process must take place and explicitly states that the approximation 
of Ukrainian legislation is “an important condition for strengthening the economic 
links between Ukraine and the Community. Ukraine shall endeavour to ensure that its 
legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community”.147 Since 
that the process of approximation of Ukrainian legislation has been gradually 
evolving and declining in line with tempo of EU-Ukraine relations.148
The “Orange revolution” gave fresh impetus to long-cherished Ukrainian aspirations 
to join the EU. New political elite headed by extremely popular opposition leader 
Viktor Yuschenko encouraged fresh pro-European sentiments among the Ukrainian 
nation. Emotional victory of Viktor Yuschenko in dramatic presidential race created 
impressive worldwide wave of sympathy towards Ukraine. Everyone in Ukraine 
expected that the EU may reconsider its prudent policy towards Ukraine and 
recognise the Ukraine’s perspective to join the EU sooner or later. One has to admit 
that these expectations were mutual. The European Parliament voted on 13 January 
2005 in favour of a non-binding resolution calling for Ukraine to be given "a clear 
European perspective, possibly leading to EU membership". MEPs said it was now 
time to consider other forms of association with Ukraine besides the Neighbourhood 
Policy. Also the Resolution advocated relaxing visa requirements for Ukraine, 
recognition of Ukraine's market economy and support for the country joining the 
World Trade Organisation. This positive message from the European Parliament was 
warmly welcomed by leaders of some EU Member States. Polish President 
Kwasniewski acted as a strong advocate of immediate enhancement of relations 
between the EU and Ukraine. President Victor Yuschenko decided to catch the unique 
political momentum and pushed all efforts towards the objective of Ukraine’s full EU 
membership. In speech at the European Parliament in February 2005 President 
Yuschenko promulgated Ukraine’s objective to complete the EU full membership 
negotiations by 2007. However, Ukraine’s European aspirations have been quickly 
cooled off at the top EU level. On January 2005 President of the European 
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Commission Jose-Manuel Barroso clearly stated that there is no perspective for 
Ukraine to join the EU in the nearest future. Commissioner Danuta Hubner 
intentionally dropped any mention about the possibility of Ukraine’s membership in 
the EU by 2015 during her speech at the University of Sussex (UK) in February 2005. 
Instead, EU officials repeatedly articulated that the fulfilment of the EU-Ukraine 
Action Plan (AP) must be a priority for EU-Ukraine relations for the immediate 
future. Consequently, the effective implementation of the AP by Ukraine could lead 
to the enhancement of the EU-Ukraine relations in political, economic and legal 
domains. 
On February 21st 2005 the AP was signed by the European Commission President 
Jose-Manuel Barroso and by Ukrainian newly appointed Prime-Minister Julia 
Timoshenko. One has to be aware, that the AP is not a document that was inspired by 
the “Orange revolution”. On the opposite, the AP is a product of negotiation between 
the Prodi’s Commission and former President Kuchma government headed by Viktor 
Yuschenko’s opponent Viktor Yanukovich in 2004. For these reasons, the new 
Ukrainian government pushed the EU towards more advanced document, which could 
either approve or just mention Ukraine’s chances to join the EU. In response to such 
emphatic strategy of the Ukrainian government, and following active mediation of 
High Representative in CFSP H. Solana, the EU added some non-binding changes to 
the document, which envisaged the conclusion a “new enhanced agreement, whose 
scope will be defined in the light of the fulfillment of the objectives of this Action 
Plan and of the overall evolution of EU – Ukraine relations” and a possibility of 
preparing for future negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement. 
The signing of the AP was welcomed by political elite in Ukraine though in 
somewhat skeptical way. It became clear that Ukrainian pro-European prognoses 
must be reconsidered in line with more pragmatic objectives of the AP. To support 
that view the EU side reiterated that the AP is the major framework document that 
shapes the format and the character of the EU-Ukraine relations in the nearest future. 
In order to enhance these relations Ukraine is expected to acknowledge and to 
implement the AP. The approximation of Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU 
constitutes one of the top AP priorities. 
The objective of this article is to discuss contemporary issues of approximation of 
Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU in the aftermath of the so called “Orange 
revolution”. In the beginning we emphasise major priorities of the approximation of 
laws process envisaged in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. In the second part of the 
article we analyse gains and setbacks of the approximation of laws process in the 
“after Orange revolution” era. In the final part of the article we examine major 
difficulties of the EU-Ukraine approximation process, which might occur in the 
immediate future. 
Approximation of laws objectives in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan 
The AP envisages the approximation of laws as a foundation for further economic 
integration between the Parties including the establishment of an EU-Ukraine Free 
Trade Area and Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. It means that the AP does not limit 
the scope of the approximation process by EU laws and standards but encompasses 
the export of wider area of economic and trade-related rules and regulations including 
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the WTO laws. This also includes the adoption of EU regulatory methods: 
convergence of economic legislation; the opening of economies to each other; and the 
continued reduction of trade barriers, which will stimulate investment and growth 
between the EU and Ukraine. The AP is explicit in stating that the approximation 
process of Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU includes the reinforcement of 
Ukrainian administrative and judicial capacity. 
Directions of approximation process in the AP comprise several blocks. The first 
block covers adoption by Ukraine of internationally established standards of 
democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. In particular, the AP 
states that Ukraine must continue its internal reforms based on strengthening 
democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, the principle of separation of 
powers and judicial independence, democratic election in accordance with OSCE and 
Council of Europe norms and standards (political pluralism, freedom of speech and 
media, respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non 
discrimination on grounds of gender, and on political, religious and ethnic grounds). 
Special attention is paid to democratic conduct of presidential (2004) and 
parliamentary (2006) elections. 
The second block encourages Ukraine to improve cooperation with the EU in areas 
including combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
illegal arms exports. Consequently, Ukraine is expected to adhere to fundamental 
international conventions in these areas (mainly the UN and FATF documents). 
The third block focuses on area of economic and social reform and development in 
Ukraine. Therein the AP explicitly states that Ukraine is expected to advance in 
gradual approximation of basic legislative and regulatory framework to that of EU, 
and ensure its effective implementation. These efforts must include ensuring 
transparency, predictability and simplification of national regulatory frameworks and 
their effective application. The AP emphasizes that full application of relevant GATT 
provisions is important precondition of further liberalisation of trade regime between 
the EU and Ukraine. It relates to issues of movement of goods, customs legislation, 
implementation of the GATT the most favored nation and national treatment 
principles. Legislative reforms must also include alignment of Ukrainian legislation 
with EU laws in consumers safety and sanitary and phytosanitary standards.
The fourth block deals with social situation, employment, poverty reduction in 
Ukraine. It is stated that Ukraine must ensure a closer approximation of national 
legislation to EU standards and practices in the area of employment and social policy. 
The fifth block covers sectoral cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. The AP 
envisages implementation by Ukraine of tax systems and their institutions based on 
international and European standards; adoption of state aid and competition laws that 
are compatible with EU laws. The Parties agreed to ensure a level of protection of 
intellectual property rights similar to that in the EU. Also Ukraine must continue 
approximation to EU legislation on public procurement in order to ensure effective 
implementation of the key principles of transparency, nondiscrimination, competition 
and access to legal recourse. These principles should apply to procurement for goods, 
services and works across all relevant public bodies at all levels. Sectoral cooperation 
envisages adoption of statistical methods fully compatible with European standards in 
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relevant areas. Besides the AP calls Ukraine to align own legislation and regulatory 
frameworks in areas of transport, energy, information society and environment, 
science and technology, education, training and youth, culture and audo-visual issues, 
civil society cooperation, public health and cross-border cooperation. 
The AP pays special attention to the Ukraine’s adherence to the vague concept of 
European common values. The AP does not specify the scope of these values. 
However they could be deduced from the draft of the Constitution for Europe.149 The 
Ukrainian commitment to common values shall be closely monitored by the EU and 
will directly influence “the pace of progress of the relationship” between the EU and 
Ukraine. Therefore, the AP induces significant approximation commitments on 
Ukraine. In general, the EU wants Ukraine to commit to the process of voluntary 
harmonisation of national legislation to the EU acquis.
Approximation of laws efforts by the Ukrainian government in the aftermath of the 
“Orange Revolution” 
The signing of the AP marked the new stage of the approximation of laws process in 
Ukraine. Below we shall consider major gains and mishaps of this intrinsic process 
for Ukraine. 
In area of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms the Ukrainian 
government took efforts to join multilateral conventions, which have not been signed 
by Ukraine yet. Ukraine became a Party to the European convention of remedies to 
victims of crimes. The Verkhovna Rada ratified the Council of Europe Civil Law 
Convention on corruption. Trough ratifying this convention Ukraine obtained 
membership in the GRECO group (Council of Europe group of countries against 
corruption). Legislative measures have been taken to involve public into decision 
making. Public Boards and expert groups (on price making and salaries) were 
established within the Cabinet of Ministers and local governments. Regulation on 
public monitoring of the Cabinet of Ministers and local governments was approved by 
the government of Ukraine. However, the long-awaited reform of judiciary did not 
succeed. The concept of judicial reform was debated in the Verkhovna Rada but 
without any effective measures adopted. 
Year 2005 has been marked by the acceleration of the EU-Ukraine cooperation in 
foreign affairs and security issues. The EU and Ukraine signed the Agreement on the 
security procedures for exchange of classified information and the Agreement 
establishing a framework for Ukraine’s participation in EU crisis management 
operations. Also Ukraine joined so called “Australian group” that is responsible for 
control over trade in dual goods. National lists of dual goods have been adopted by 
the Ukrainian government in accordance with recommendations of the “Australian 
group”. Access of EU nationals to the Ukrainian territory was considerably 
liberalised. Ukraine voluntary abolished the visa regime for EU and Swiss national 
from 1 May 2005 in remote hopes of adequate measures on behalf of the EU. 
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Following reiterating requests from the EU the Ukrainian government started 
negotiations on the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement. 
In economic and social areas the Ukrainian executive and legislature made serious 
efforts to liberalise national services market and to accelerate structural reforms. The 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted for consideration and plenary debates draft laws 
on mortgage securities, stock market as well as laws on opening domestic markets to 
foreign banks and auditors and the draft law on liberalisations and permissions and 
approvals in commercial activities. Furthermore, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a 
package of laws aimed at dismantling discrimination of foreign investors in Ukraine. 
In particular, 5 years moratorium on setting new tax privileges was introduced. Tax 
privileges in free economic zones were abolished. In area of fiscal control the 
government of Ukraine eliminated the mandatory selling of 50% of foreign currency 
income by enterprises. 
The Ukrainian government and the Verkhovna Rada achieved positive results in 
preparation of the Ukrainian membership in the WTO. By the end of 2006 the 
Ukrainian government signed all bilateral protocols on mutual access of goods and 
services (apart from Kyrgyz Republic and Taiwan) with members of the WTO 
working group on accession of Ukraine. It means that the Ukrainian government 
agreed 98% of national consolidated tariff nomenclature with other countries – WTO 
members. The EU and the USA have granted to Ukraine the status of the market 
economy country. Furthermore, the USA recognised democratic and market economy 
reforms in Ukraine by lifting notorious Jackson-Vanik amendment, which imposes 
discrimination on goods from the former USSR republics. The government of 
Ukraine adopted new regulations to liberalise the access of foreign investors to 
domestic markets and to protect their intellectual property rights. Privileges of 
national producers in car making industry were abolished. Ukrainian sanitary, 
phytosanitary and technical standards have been further aligned with EU relevant 
standards. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine decreased export and import tariffs on 
agricultural products and iron scrap. Besides, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a package 
of laws, which allowed the liberalisation of national insurance, audit and banking 
services in 5 years time after accession into the WTO. As a result of these legislative 
reforms the Ukrainian government claimed that the WTO ministers may consider the 
issue of the Ukraine membership in February 2007. However, the eventual WTO 
membership could only be considered possible after the Verkhovna Rada adopts the 
package of the liberalisation of trade laws. Frequent changes of government in 
Ukraine hinder this possibility thereby leaving Ukraine’s chances to join the WTO 
before the Russian Federation under question. In area of environment protection the 
Ukrainian government confirmed its adherence to objectives of the Kyoto Protocol 
and took first steps to implement Kyoto Protocol requirements. In area of education 
Ukraine joined the Bologna Process in May 2005. 
The Ministry of Justice continues to play an important role in the approximation of 
laws process. More than 3000 pages of the EU acquis have been translated by the 
Ministry of Justice in 2005 and 2006. Only in the first half of 2005 experts of the 
Ministry of Justice approved 121 drafts of legal acts as confirming EU law standards. 
About 100 legal drafts were sent back to responsible ministries for further 
improvement in accordance with EU acquis. Besides, the Ministry of Justice assisted 
to the Verkhovna Rada in reviewing compliance of legislative drafts with EU laws. 
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However, the process of the AP implementation encountered significant problems and 
setbacks in the “after Orange revolution” period. The first, and in our opinion the 
major problem is that the implementation of the AP did not tackled the reform of 
judiciary. Hitherto, judiciary remains the most non-transparent branch of power in 
Ukraine. In opinion of Ukrainian public the judiciary is associated with sophisticated 
corruption. Access to judicial profession is extremely limited and, therefore, 
suspected in nepotism. In 2005 and 2006 some Ukrainian judges issued conflicting 
and perplexing judgments that suited interests of specific political groups. As a result, 
the Ukrainian judiciary gained negative image and disrespect with Ukrainian public 
opinion. This disappointing situation could be explained by several reasons. The first 
reason is lack of professionals who could personally initiate the reform of judiciary. 
Unfortunately, neither any of “after Orange revolution” Ministers of Justice nor any 
of prominent judges took courage to launch urgently needed reforms. The second 
reason is political pressure on the Ukrainian judiciary on behalf of the Ukrainian 
government. Some members of the “Orange revolution” team were accused in 
pressing judges to issue decisions, which suited political interests of the government. 
Important change in sphere of judiciary which must be highlighted is opening for 
Ukrainian public case practice of Ukrainian courts. It is hoped very much that this 
reform will encourage further reform of the Ukrainian judiciary towards transparency 
and democracy. 
The second problem of the approximation of laws process in Ukraine is that the 
Verkhovna Rada kept many legislative drafts required by the AP in pipeline without 
approval. For example, the Verkhovna Rada approved the first draft of law on equal 
opportunities for men and women. Issue of public television and radio channel as well 
as amendments related to protection of rights of imprisoned who are in custody for a 
long time were debated but not approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 
The third problem is overall stagnation of the Ukrainian economy in the “after Orange 
revolution” era. In our opinion this factor negatively influenced the tempo of the 
approximation of laws process in Ukraine. The impressive growth of 2004 economy 
has stalled due to the disappointment of foreign investors from inconsistent and 
unpredictable policy of the Ukrainian government. Foreign investors called the 
Ukrainian government to ensure two major guarantees: 1) certain degree of 
predictability of the governmental policy towards investors, and 2) high standards of 
equality between all players on the market.150 However, the Ukrainian government 
headed by Julia Timoshenko ignored these calls. One of its first actions was the 
dismantlement of numerous free economic zones in Ukraine thereby infringing upon 
interests of foreign investors already operating in Ukraine. Also, the Ukrainian 
government embarked upon the policy of active interference into national economy. 
Facing the eminent rise of Russian export tariffs on gas and oil the government of 
Ukraine revalued the Ukrainian hryvna. The objective of this interference was to 
compensate losses of petroleum importers in return of keeping petroleum prices at the 
fixed level. However, these efforts let to almost total deficit of petroleum and 50% 
rise in petroleum prices in Ukraine. In area of privatisation the government of Ukraine 
launched the notorious campaign of re-privatisation. It means that the government 
questioned the legality of privatisation of earlier privatised companies. However the 
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new government was accused in political lustration and redistribution of private 
property to new owners who are loyal to the ruling political elite. As a result of these 
events the economic growth in Ukraine has lost its dynamic and even fall down. 
Forecasted 7% GDP growth turned to less than 4% GDP growth in 2005.151
Furthermore, Ukraine went through serious institutional crisis in area of European 
integration. The Ukrainian government did not manage to solve the issue of 
separation of competences within the executive in area of European integration. 
Former Vice Prime-Minister in European Integration Oleg Rybachuk’s efforts to 
establish the Ministry of European Integration, which could be responsible for 
intergovernmental coordination and control in issues including the approximation of 
laws, failed. It appeared that Vice Prime-Minister Rybachuk encroached into 
competences of other ministries, in particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the 
end, not only plans to set up the Ministry of European Integration were dropped but 
the position of Vice Prime-Minister in European Integration was eliminated. 
Future action on Approximation of Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU 
The above mentioned setbacks of the approximation of laws process in Ukraine were 
engendered by several problems. The prime problem was caused by the luck of 
experienced professionals in the early “after Orange revolution” governments. Very 
few professionals have been promoted to top positions in the government in the 
aftermath of the “Orange revolution”. In general, top executive positions were 
distributed to politicians who either directly or indirectly supported the “Orange 
revolution”. As a result, these governments lacked bold initiative professionals who 
were able to accelerate the approximation of law process and to initiate far reaching 
political, economic and legal reforms in Ukraine. Another problem was caused by 
lack of effective cooperation between the Ukrainian government and the Verkhovna 
Rada in issues of aligning Ukrainian legislation in line with EU standards. Many of 
the government bills have been blocked by the Verkhovna Rada not only because 
political clashes but also because of insufficient and ineffective exchange of 
information between the government and the Verkhovna Rada. For instance, this 
problem appeared during the adoption of the package of laws needed for the 
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. Furthermore, the Ukrainian government failed to be 
transparent to the Ukrainian nation. Many of seminal decisions have been taken 
“behind closed doors” without involvement of general public into the decision 
making. Ukrainian journalists protested against the absence of fairness in the 
Ukrainian media and presence of nepotism in top appointments. 
The approximation of laws programme in Ukraine came through several serious 
internal and external challenges. The first challenge is associated with results of 
Ukrainian parliamentary elections on March 26th 2006 which displayed growing 
dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian population with the progress of European integration. 
More than a third of votes was casted in favour of pro-Eastern oriented parties (Party 
of Regions, Communist Party). In other words, significant part of the Ukrainian 
nation expressed their wiliness for deeper economic integration with former Soviet 
republics through closer involvement into the Single Economic Space (SES) 
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initiatives. Nevertheless, results of the 2006 parliamentary elections could hardly 
change priorities of the Ukrainian foreign policy in the immediate future. Both 
possible coalitions in the Verkhovna Rada (“democratic coalition” headed by 
charismatic Julia Timoshenko and “anti-crisis coalition” chaired by pro-Russian 
Viktor Yanukovich) confirmed continuation of pro-European course of the Ukrainian 
foreign policy. It means that, at least in the foreseeable future, new Ukrainian 
government will continue further rapprochement with the EU through participation in 
the “Wider Europe” initiative with hope to set up a free trade area between the EU 
and Ukraine and to open sectors of the EU internal market to Ukrainian undertakings.  
Realising the need to provide more backing to pro-European parliamentary coalition 
in Ukraine the European Parliament issued non-binding resolution on the 
parliamentary elections in Ukraine.152 In this resolution the European Parliament 
praised “democratic and transparent manner” of Ukrainian elections and asked “the 
new government formed after these elections to consolidate Ukraine’s exposal of 
common European values and objectives”. The most importantly, this resolution 
“calls on the Commission to begin to negotiate an Association Agreement” with 
Ukraine. It means that the European Parliament urged the Commission to start 
negotiations on a new agreement, which should substitute the outdated Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Ukraine (came into force on 
1st March 1998 and it is due to expire in 2008). Mere reference to the need to 
conclude an association agreement with Ukraine does not imply that objective of this 
agreement will be either the full membership of Ukraine in the EU or even remote 
perspective of that. However, a new association agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine might lead to closer political and economic rapprochement between the 
Parties through establishment of a customs union/a free trade area and liberalisation 
of mutual trade. In case if “anti-crisis coalition” will form majority in the Verkhovna 
Rada and form a new government the Ukrainian foreign policy will return to the 
multi-vector foreign policy that was actively employed by former President L. 
Kuchma. It means that while maintaining participation of Ukraine in the ENP the 
“anti-crisis coalition” will reinvigorate Ukraine’s participation in the Russia led 
integration project, which might lead to eventual establishment of customs union in 
the former USSR area. In return, Ukraine could get access to cheaper energy supplies 
from Russia and its satellites. The newly appointed Prime-Minister Victor 
Yanukovich advocates an idea of coordination and synchronisation of Ukrainian and 
Russian policies in relation to joining the WTO and closer rapprochement with the 
EU. This strategy could have significant implications for Ukraine. Taking into 
account that the Russian government is not keen on accepting “democratic and human 
rights clauses” in future agreement with the EU153 one may predict a possibility 
application of similar pragmatic policy by the Ukrainian government during 
negotiations on new EU-Ukraine Neighbourhood Agreement. Hitherto, the new 
government in Ukraine confirms its support for pro-European foreign policy of 
Ukraine and need to enter into new level neighbourhood relations with the EU and 
acceptance of common democratic values with the EU. The second challenge is 
related to the recent political and economic crisis in the EU, which handicaps all EU 
intentions to reward Ukraine for possible successes of its approximation programme. 
Facing continuing constitutional crisis and further wave of enlargement the EU is 
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keen to safeguard its public opinion by adding so called “absorption” or “integration 
capacity” in addition to well known Copenhagen criteria for any countries which wish 
to join the EU.154 This dubious situation might bring the EU-Ukraine approximation 
process to the standstill. 
Future action on approximation of laws in Ukraine must undergo serious revisions in 
order to achieve objectives of the AP. There is an urging need to shift from mere 
legislative approximation of laws towards more close involvement of judiciary into 
the approximation of laws process. The Ukrainian judiciary must pay more attention 
to applying EU general principles in the process of taking decisions. References to 
EU general principles and EU common values could drastically accelerate the process 
of approximation of laws on all levels of power in Ukraine. The Ukrainian judiciary 
may serve the role of catalyst of the whole approximation of laws process in Ukraine 
by actively applying European legal heritage in own decisions. Work of law 
enforcement bodies in Ukraine need drastic reform too. Many of court decisions can 
not be enforced due to luck of efficiency and sufficient competence of law 
enforcement officials. Experience of reform of law enforcement bodies in EU 
Member States and former candidate countries must be taken into account. Therefore, 
the priority of the approximation of laws process must be given to the reform of 
judiciary and law enforcement bodies. 
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